Adam Shostack posts on The Recent History of the Future of Cash. He points out that the choice between cash and electronic payment systems is influenced by questions of trust. In some countries with high inflation, people don't trust cash. But people also don't trust complex and unreliable electronic systems.
Lack of trust increases transaction costs. If I am constantly on guard because of unexpected charges on my account - whether this is due to error or fraud, or simply because the service provider is pocketing a fee for something - then I may have to maintain transaction archives, or copy every transaction into a separate spreadsheet or database. Adam links to a post by Gary Leff, who prints out everything he can think of because he is expecting to be cheated out of some complicated deal on frequent flier miles. This kind of thing is symptomatic of the shallow and short-sighted version of the Support Economy.
Meanwhile, when I buy a book from my local bookshop, the shop accepts cash or debit cards. But if I use a card, the bank will take a cut of the transaction (from the shop). So I prefer to pay cash if I can: cash doesn't really cost me any more than card, but I prefer the shop to get all the money.
Some people feel safer just carrying a card, because cash can be lost or stolen. But which is the greater risk - being mugged by a drug addict in the street, or being ripped off by a major corporation? Different people balance those risks differently.
Showing posts with label risk. Show all posts
Showing posts with label risk. Show all posts
Saturday, July 12, 2008
Sunday, October 23, 2005
Quarantine 2
A parrot infected with H5N1 dies in quarantine (BBC news). Does this mean that quarantine works, or at least has worked in this instance, to protect us from bird flu?
In a contrasting example, sniffer dogs, returning to the UK from earthquake duty in Algeria (BBC News) and Kashmir (Reuters), are forced to undergo quarantine (making them unavailable for further duties for six months, including protection against terrorism). Does this mean that quarantine is stupid and inflexible? Is this yet another example of interference (poor interoperability) between different security systems?
Even in this case there is a possible justification for quarantine, since it seems reasonable to suppose that a dog operating in a crisis zone such as Kashmir or New Orleans might be at greater risk of disease. The dog is doing dangerous work, and is highly likely to receive scratches and other minor injuries through which germs can enter. And there are more germs, as well as stray dogs, rats and other threats.
Rescue dogs are in a similar position to human medical staff - they are more likely to catch things. Of course they have all the possible jabs, but is that enough? And of course they have plenty of opportunity to transmit things to people who are already weak and are therefore particularly vulnerable to infection. Do you want to be bitten by the dog that pulls you from the rubble?
So there is a complicated risk trade-off calculation going on here. Who is going to do this risk calculation? The existing systems and regulations may produce absurd results, but what is the alternative? The Home Secretary overturns the regulations?!?
Meanwhile, what about young men with strong religious beliefs, who go to foreign countries to provide earthquake assistance. The UK security forces will find it hard to work out which ones have had contact with dangerous influences, and will therefore be obliged to put all of them into some kind of virtual quarantine (e.g. close surveillance) on their return.
How effective, efficient and fair is any given security mechanism, and what are the unwanted side-effects?
Technorati Tags: quarantine risk security
In a contrasting example, sniffer dogs, returning to the UK from earthquake duty in Algeria (BBC News) and Kashmir (Reuters), are forced to undergo quarantine (making them unavailable for further duties for six months, including protection against terrorism). Does this mean that quarantine is stupid and inflexible? Is this yet another example of interference (poor interoperability) between different security systems?
Even in this case there is a possible justification for quarantine, since it seems reasonable to suppose that a dog operating in a crisis zone such as Kashmir or New Orleans might be at greater risk of disease. The dog is doing dangerous work, and is highly likely to receive scratches and other minor injuries through which germs can enter. And there are more germs, as well as stray dogs, rats and other threats.
Rescue dogs are in a similar position to human medical staff - they are more likely to catch things. Of course they have all the possible jabs, but is that enough? And of course they have plenty of opportunity to transmit things to people who are already weak and are therefore particularly vulnerable to infection. Do you want to be bitten by the dog that pulls you from the rubble?
So there is a complicated risk trade-off calculation going on here. Who is going to do this risk calculation? The existing systems and regulations may produce absurd results, but what is the alternative? The Home Secretary overturns the regulations?!?
Meanwhile, what about young men with strong religious beliefs, who go to foreign countries to provide earthquake assistance. The UK security forces will find it hard to work out which ones have had contact with dangerous influences, and will therefore be obliged to put all of them into some kind of virtual quarantine (e.g. close surveillance) on their return.
How effective, efficient and fair is any given security mechanism, and what are the unwanted side-effects?
Technorati Tags: quarantine risk security
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RichardVeryard,
risk,
trustandsecurity
Saturday, January 08, 2005
Trust Cycle
Interesting press release from researchers at the University of California at San Diego.
Pharmacy dispensing volumes spike at the start of each month, because of the timing of government assistance payments . This leads to a spike in medication errors, resulting in a spike in mortality.
Thus trust goes in cycles. At some times of the month you get a rushed service, with little opportunity for personal (authentic) interaction. At other times, the pharmacist may be able to spend a little more time on each item, not just checking the technical correctness of the medication but also relating to the patient as a person.
There are three types of risk that may be affected by this cycle.
POSIWID thinkers may note that the negative impact of this phenomenon falls disproportionately on those dependent on government assistance, thus effecting a kind of triage. God forbid there is any purpose in here.
Pharmacy dispensing volumes spike at the start of each month, because of the timing of government assistance payments . This leads to a spike in medication errors, resulting in a spike in mortality.
Thus trust goes in cycles. At some times of the month you get a rushed service, with little opportunity for personal (authentic) interaction. At other times, the pharmacist may be able to spend a little more time on each item, not just checking the technical correctness of the medication but also relating to the patient as a person.
There are three types of risk that may be affected by this cycle.
- Implementation risk - is this correctly dispensing what was prescribed?
- Composition risk - how does this medication interact with anything else the patient is doing/taking?
- Intention risk - is this the right prescription for this patient?
POSIWID thinkers may note that the negative impact of this phenomenon falls disproportionately on those dependent on government assistance, thus effecting a kind of triage. God forbid there is any purpose in here.
Labels:
pharma,
RichardVeryard,
risk,
trustandsecurity
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